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COMPULSORY LICENSING OF A TRADEMARK
VINCENT N. PALLADINO*
Like most rights, the rights in a trade-mark can be abused; but
since mankind has found the trade-mark a useful device for some
centuries, it is hardly likely that it has been reserved to present day
critics to be the first [to] discover their iniquitous (as they say)
character. The problem today is to adapt the trade-mark construc-
tively to modern conditions and at the same time to preserve its
useful features. This problem is not for the courts alone.'
INTRODUCTION
everal processors of lemon juice may soon be marketing their
products under the "ReaLemon" trademark, which since 1962
has been owned exclusively by Borden, Inc. This surprising possi-
bility is the result of a recent administrative finding that Borden
has used the trademark to acquire and maintain monopoly power
in the processed lemon juice market.2 In order to restore compe-
tition, an administrative law judge of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) has ordered Borden to grant to any lemon juice
0 Member, New York State Bar; BA., Yale University, 1972; J.D., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1975.
1. 1 H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETMION AND TRADEMARKS § 190a, at 526 (4th
ed. 1947).
2. Borden, Inc., No. 8978 (FTC, Initial Decision Aug. 19, 1976). [A summary of the
findings and portions of the order are printed in 3 TRADE RG. REP. (CCH) 21,194, at
21,107 (1977) . Parallel citations are provided where possible.]
The initial decision holds that Borden's practices violated section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), which provides in perti-
nent part:
(a)(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair ... acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any ...
corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair ...
act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission
that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public,
it shall issue and serve upon such . . . corporation a complaint stating its charges
in that respect ....
It has been held that a violation of the substantive provisions of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), or of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), is a
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. United States v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 285 F.2d 607, 610 n.4 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). The creation
and maintenance of monopoly power alleged in Borden is a violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and as such is within the scope of section 5.
Borden, Inc., slip op. at 156-62.
The initial decision has been appealed to the FTC. Oral argument was heard on
February 16, 1977. No decision of the Commission has been issued to date.
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processor a license to use the name and label design of "Rea-
Lemon. '
Compulsory licensing of a trademark for a violation of anti-
trust law is a novel remedy.4 The purpose of this article, therefore,
is to determine whether, in general, the remedy is an appropriate
one, by considering its possible justifications, identifying the trade-
mark interests it affects, and balancing those interests against the
objectives of antitrust law.
I. SUGGESTED RATIONALES FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING
OF A TRADEMARK
It is well settled that the FTC has broad discretion to for-
mulate a remedy, once an antitrust violation has been found;8 yet
it is equally clear that its discretion is not without limits.' A
remedy must be reasonably related to the violation sought to be
cured7 and must be in the public interest.8
3. The order in Borden provides in pertinent part:
[R]espondent, Borden, Inc., a corporation, for a period of ten (10) years from the
date of this order, upon written request from any person, partnership, corporation
or business entity engaged in or desiring to enter the business of producing and
marketing processed lemon juice, [shall] grant a license to such person, partner-
ship, corporation or business entity to use the name "ReaLemon" and the label
design of ReaLemon on containers of reconstituted lemon juice.
Slip op. at 167, 3 TRADE: RG. REP. (CCH) T 21,194, at 21,108.
That the primary objective of the order is to restore competition is made clear earlier
in thge opinion. "The heart of the monopoly power preserved and maintained by respon-
dent' Borden lies in the ReaLemon trademark and its dominant market position. For
competition to enter the processed lemon juice industry, the barrier to entry which in-
heres in the ReaLemon trademark must be eliminated." Slip op. at 164.
4. See notes 9 & 10 infra & accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 376 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611
(1946); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975); Alterman Foods Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1974); Sun-
shine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (Ist Cir. 1973); P.F. Collier & Son
Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
6. See, e.g., FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1967); Marco Sales Co.
v. FTC, 453 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1971); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir.
1971).
7. See, e.g., FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1967); Atlantic Ref.
Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 377 (1964) ; Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 997 (5th
Cir. 1974); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (Ist Cir.
1973); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir. 1971); P.F. Collier & Son Corp.
v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. at 369; P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v.
FTC, 427 F.2d at 267; Saucke v. FTC, 333 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (N.D. Ga. 1971); 15 U.C.
§ 45(b) (1970).
COMPULSORY TRADEMARK LICENSING
Identification of the arguments in favor of compulsory licens-
ing of a trademark is difficult, since the remedy has never before
been ordered by a court or administrative body.9 Consequently,
few of the leading treatise writers who are concerned with trade-
marks and the relationship between antitrust and trademark law
have considered the topic.10 One leading authority who has sug-
gested that " 'divestiture' or compulsory licensing of trademarks
can be used to remedy an antitrust violation,"'" nonetheless cau-
tions that case law has labeled divestiture a drastic remedy that
should be used sparingly. 2 Moreover, none of the cases cited in
support of his position actually involved compulsory licensing.13
Rather, each case proposed divestiture, and it will readily be seen
that divestiture is not the equivalent of compulsory licensing. In
divestiture, the exclusive right to use a trademark is transferred
from one source to another, whereas compulsory licensing invali-
dates a trademark by a general grant of the right to its use. 4
A review of the developments leading to the Borden decision
sheds little light on the compulsory licensing issue.'Y It is fair to
9. In two antitrust cases, defendants entered into consent decrees providing, inter
alia, that they "dedicate . . . to the public" certain of their trademarks. United States v.
A.B. Dick Co., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 62,357, 62,360-61 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v.
Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 69,681 (D.R.I.). Assuming that at least the effect
of dedication and of compulsory licensing of a trademark would be similar, neither decree
gives any clue as to the need or reasons for the adoption of the remedy.
10. See, e.g., 1-2 H. NrMs, supra note 1; 1-5 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, (3d ed. 1967); J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTEcrION AND
PRACTICE (1974). There are three possible explanations for this lack of precedent. Licens-
ing of a trademark in any manner is a relatively recent legal development. See text ac-
companying notes 79-80 infra. Similarly, the search for remedies to cure an antitrust vio-
lation involving the use of a trademark is a comparatively new undertaking. See Nims,
Basic Trends in the Relation of General Unfair Competition Law to Antitrust Law, 39
TRADEMARK REP. 279, 281 (1949). Finally, even less far reaching remedies, such as divesti-
ture, have been recognized as drastic and are a means of last resort for curing violations
of antitrust law. Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 48-49 (7th Cir. 1961).
11. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:23, at 415 (1973).
12. Id.
13. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 251-F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Va. 1965),
aff'd, 401 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835
(D.NJ. 1953).
14. See text accompanying note 143 infra. McCarthy appears to have reconsidered
his position. He opposed compulsory licensing of a trademark in a speech delivered to the
United States Trademark Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco on May 3, 1977.
See PAT. T.M. & CoPYRIuHr J. (BNA) No. 330, May 26, 1977, at A-10 to -12.
15. In the mid-1960's, attorneys at the FTC brought pressure to bear upon the Com-
'mission to institute a series of actions aimed at deconcentrating a number of the nation's
major oligopolies. The so-called "Cereal Case," Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (FTC, filed April 26,
1972), is a result of such pressure. See Memorandum from Rufus E. Wilson, Chief of the
Division of General Trade Restraints, to the Commission, "Request for Authorization for
Investigation of the Breakfast-Cereal Industry" (June 4, 1969), reprinted in 4 ANTrrRusT
1977]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
suggest that the FTC views compulsory licensing of a trademark
as a potent weapon in the battle against oligopoly,10 but this speaks
more to the motive underlying the application of the remedy than
to the justification for its imposition.
The remedy of compulsory licensing finds direct support in
neither case law nor commentary. There are, however, five ra-
tionales which warrant critical examination.
A. Genericness and Monopoly Power
It has been asserted that judicial power to declare a trademark
to be a generic term provides support for compulsory trademark
licensing.17 This contention presents what is superficially the
strongest argument in favor of the remedy, but embodies what
is in reality the most fundamental misconception surrounding the
subject. The fact that a generic term-which is worthless as a trade-
mark because anyone may use it-may be declared to be generic
does not support compulsory licensing. A declaration of generic-
ness gives official recognition to the fact that a term is incapable
of functioning as a trademark, whereas compulsory licensing pre-
vents a term from so functioning. The former practice furthers
both trademark and antitrust interests; the latter impairs trade-
mark interests without adequately promoting antitrust interests.
It is an axiom of trademark law that a term which is the
L. & ECON. REv., No. 4, at 59 (1971). The "Cereal Case" is the first of what may turn out to
be a series of actions brought by the government to reduce such economic concentration.
See Memorandum from John R. Ferguson, Bureau of Competition, to the Commission,
"The Case for Antitrust Suits Against Selected Oligopoly Industries" (June 11, 1971), re-
printed in (pts. 1-2), 7 AwNrrRusr L. & EcoN. REv., No. 4, at 26 (1975), 8 ADMsrausr L. &
EcON. Rv., No. 1, at 35 (1976). Borden has been acknowledged as a "test case" brought in
connection with the "Cereal Case." Trademarks: ReaLemon Showdown Begins, 6 PRoDUar
MARKETING, Feb. 1977, at 6, 8.
16.
We would emphasize again ... that the central thrust of any proceeding
here would be oriented primarily toward the structure/performance characteristics
of the industry in question and that the role of the relevant conduct . . . is a
secondary one.... [T]he "conduct" pattern we expect to find in the industry is
not the gravamen of the case .... [I]t does not necessarily bear a great deal of re-
lation to the kind of relief that we might ultimately want to ask for.
Memorandum from Rufus E. Wilson, supra note 15, reprinted in 4 ANTITRUSr L. & ECON.
Rv., No. 4, at 73-74 (1971). See also Lublin, Stephanie Kanwit: Chicago Firebrand for the
FTG, Jumis DocroR, May 1977, at 28; Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function
of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADEfARK REP. 75, 84-85 (1974).
17. Comment, Abuse of Trademarks: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing, 7 U1.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 644, 650 (1973).
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generic name of a product cannot be used as a trademark for that
product. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Good-
year Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.,'8 where it held that the term
"Goodyear Rubber" was not subject to exclusive appropriation
and could not be protected as a trademark. 9 Eight years later the
Court reached a similar result in the landmark case of Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.,20 where it refused
to enjoin defendant's use of "Singer" and "Improved Singer" on
sewing machines after finding that "[t]he word 'Singer' was
adopted by I. M. Singer &c Co., or the Singer Manufacturing Com-
pany, in their dealings with the general public, as designative of
their distinctive style of machines rather than as solely indicating
the origin of manufacture." 2'
The principle of these and other cases22 is that a term used
by the public to describe a product is incapable of designating a
particular manufacturer or merchant as the source of that product.
Consequently, such a term must be freely available for use by
all manufacturers or merchants who wish to describe their goods.
The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) 2 recognizes this prin-
ciple by providing that a merely descriptive term may not be
registered as a trademark,24 and by permitting any person to file
a petition to cancel the registration of a trademark that has become
"the common descriptive name of an article or substance." 25 In-
deed, the statute empowers the FTC to file such a petition .2
Although declaring a trademark to be a generic term and
compelling its licensing for a violation of antitrust law both involve
invalidation of a trademark, the similarity ends there. Declaring
a trademark to be a generic term reflects the fact that the public
uses the term not to identify the source of a product, but to de-
18. 128 U.S. 598 (1888). In reaching its decision the Court relied on dictum in Canal
Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 882 (1871).
19. 128 U.S. at 602.
20. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
21. .d. at 181. The term "Singer" was subsequently rehabilitated through long and
continuous exclusive use and is today recognized as one of the best known trademarks.
22. E.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Dresser Indus.,
Inc. v. Heracus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir. 1968); King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963); Telechron, Inc. v.
Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1952); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod.
Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1970).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (c) (1970). See generally id. §§ 1064 (a), (b), (d), (e) (1970).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
scribe the product. The evidence requires the result. The result,
moreover, promotes trademark interests by weeding out, so to
speak, terms that do not identify source and concurrently promotes
antitrust interests by preventing one business from appropriating
a common property. In comparison, compulsory licensing as 'a
remedy for an antitrust violation, does not reflect any finding con.,
cerning the public's use of a term. Rather, the remedy is predicated
on a finding that the trademark has been used to violate antitrust
law. This finding does not require the invalidation of the trade-
mark that necessarily results. Furthermore, the result adequately
promotes neither trademark nor antitrust interests.21
The case can occur in which a trademark that has been used
to violate antitrust law is also a generic term, but the occurrence
is quite coincidental. For the most part, where a trademark has
been used to violate antitrust law, it is a well-known term that
exerts power in a market precisely because it identifies a single
source to the consumer. Such a trademark is not a generic term
which the public uses to describe a product produced by many
manufacturers or sold by many merchants.
Even where it can be shown that a trademark that is used to
violate antitrust law is a generic term, a declaration of genericness
rather than compulsory licensing is the appropriate remedy. De,
claring a trademark to be a generic term reveals an understanding
of trademark law as well as an intention to promote antitrust
interests. Compulsory licensing, on the other hand, focusing ex-
clusively on antitrust interests and ignoring the rational basis of
trademark law, is a myopic attempt to deal with a specific prob-
lem-how to restore competition in a market dominated by a
product sold under a trademark.
No doubt the temptation to equate compulsory licensing with
a finding of genericness in large part stems from misuse of the
term "monopoly."2 Permitting a manufacturer or merchant to
use a generic term as a trademark indeed confers a monopoly in
the use of that term-it becomes practically impossible for rival
merchants and manufacturers to describe their goods without in-
fringing a trademark and risking litigation, and for the public
27. See text accompanying notes 141-43 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 111-14 infra. The opinion in Borden reflects this
confusion, stating in a section on "Monopoly Power" that "'ReaLemon' is virtually syn-
onymous with bottled lemon juice." Slip op. at 151.
[Vol. 26
COMPULSORY TRADEMARK LICENSING
to purchase a product from any source other than the trademark
owner.
A finding that a generic term has been used as a trademark
implies the existence of antitrust monopoly power and therefore
justifies invalidation: such a trademark is of no value to the public.
The converse does not hold true, however. A finding of antitrust
monopoly power in a market dominated by a product sold under
a trademark does not necessarily imply genericness, and, conse-
quently, does not justify invalidation; the trademark, though mis-
used, is in all likelihood valid.
The great danger in ordering compulsory licensing of a trade-
mark for a violation of antitrust law is that the step may be taken
without any consideration of its impact on trademark interests.2 9
If a term acquires such extraordinary power that it is unlawful
to permit its exclusive appropriation, a declaration of genericness
is entirely appropriate, and will promote both antitrust and trade-
mark interests. If, on the other hand, a trademark is used to violate
the antitrust laws, but is not a generic term, it is totally inappro-
priate to declare it generic sub silentio by means of compulsory
licensing.
B. Compulsory Licensing of a Patent
Compulsory licensing of a patent, adopted as a remedy for a
violation of antitrust law, may be considered as precedent for the
adoption of a similar remedy in a trademark case.3 0 Critical exam-
ination of the respective natures of patents and trademarks, how-
ever, and of the cases ordering compulsory licensing of the former,
indicates that the remedy cannot be transferred from the patent
to the trademark field.
A patent and a trademark are dissimilar in several respects.
Different bodies of law underlie their existence and regulation.3'
Whereas a patent is a legally sanctioned monopoly in a process
29. The 170 page initial decision in Borden does not cite a single trademark case
nor does it refer to the Lanham Act. See slip op. at 136-61 (discussion of legal and factual
issues).
30. The decision in Borden reaches this conclusion. Id. at 164-65.
31. See TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). A trademark is a creature of the
common law, wholly dependent for its existence on actual use, and may be regulated by
the federal government under the commerce clause. U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. By con-
trast, the creation and federal regulation of a patent are supported by U.S. CoNsr. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8, which authorizes the creation of limited monopolies in copyrights and patents.
1977]
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or product, a trademark represents nothing more than the right
to use a term in a particular capacity. 2 In addition, a patent de-
mands novelty and invention and promotes the public disclosure
of ideas. A trademark, on the other hand, requires neither novelty
nor invention, and it protects the public from confusion." These
are not merely trivial or theoretical differences.84
The statute that confers patent rights also imposes limitations
on their enjoyment.35 No statute creates trademark rights; they
arise solely from use. Limitations imposed upon that use must be
devised rationally, as statutory limitations on patent rights have
been. Furthermore, trademark owners should be apprised of the
consequences of their actions just as patent owners have been
given notice of the conditions imposed upon patent use.
The economic power embodied in a patent monopoly far
exceeds the power incident to the right to use a term as a trade-
mark.3 6 Similarly, the requirement that a patent involve novelty
and invention suggests that the subject matter of a patent is likely
to be of greater economic importance than a trademark, which is
a mere word or symbol.
Finally, the purpose of a patent-to facilitate the disclosure
of new ideas-is not completely frustrated by a general grant of
the right to exploit the idea, once it is disclosed. In contrast, the
primary purpose of a trademark-the avoidance of public con-
fusion-is impaired irreparably by a similar grant of the right to
its use.
Nevertheless, one need not accept the distinctions between
a patent and a trademark in order to be persuaded that the cases
ordering compulsory licensing of a patent do not support com-
pulsory licensing of a trademark. The cases that have dealt with
compulsory patent licensing recognize the appropriateness of the
remedy only where the patent itself is invalid.87 To impose a similar
32. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afJ'd, 433
F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316
(N.D. Ohio 1949), modified on other grounds, 341 U.S. 593 (1950). See also I H. NiMS,
supra note 1, § 188, at 521; 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 10, §§ 66.1-.3, at 20-47.
33. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 6:3, at 127-28.
34. See Comment, Use of a Trade-Mark in Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1002, 1008-09 (1957).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
36. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. at 1314.
37. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 414-15 (1945); American
Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 26
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limitation upon compulsory trademark licensing would render
the remedy unnecessary.3 8
C. Section 14 of the Lanham Act
Section 14 of the Lanham Act,39 which empowers the FTC to
petition for cancellation of trademark registrations, 40 may be read
to approve compulsory licensing.41 Two problems, however, arise
from such a reading.
First, the statute does not expressly authorize cancellation of a
registration for a violation of antitrust law.42 Second, even assuming
the language of the statute may be interpreted to permit cancella-
tion for such an abuse, 3 there are basic differences between can-
celling a registration and invalidating a trademark.
Whereas the importance of a valid trademark registration
should not be underestimated,44 a fundamental distinction must
be drawn between a registration and a trademark. The Lanham
Act makes it clear that trademark ownership, derived from use, is
a prerequisite to registration,45 and the courts have consistently
recognized a basic difference between registration and the right
to use a trademark.40 Cancelling a registration repeals certain
38. Resolving the question of validity in the negative would bring about the same
result as compulsory licensing. See text accompanying notes 17-29 supra (invalidation of
a trademark because of genericness). Finding a trademark valid would preclude adoption
of the remedy based solely on the authority of patent cases.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
40. See, e.g., Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1961).
41. Cancellation renders a registration invalid, while compulsory licensing has the
same effect upon a trademark. Both remedies reduce the scope of a trademark owner's
rights in a trademark.
42.
A verified petition to cancel a registration of a mark . . . may . . . be filed
... at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive name of
an article or substance, or has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained
fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 4 or of subsections (a), (b),
or (c) of section 2 of this Act for a registration hereunder, or contrary to similar
prohibitory provisions of said prior Acts for a registration thereunder, or if the
registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as
to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in connection with which the
mark is used.
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (c) (1970).
Sections 2(a)-(c) of the Lanham Act deal with the use of immoral, deceptive or
scandalous matter, or certain names and insignia, as trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(c)
(1970).
43. Cf. Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968, 974 (W.D.
Mo. 1966) (fraternity insignia, registered as trademarks, integral to an antitrust scheme).
44. See 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 19:4-:15, at 658-61.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
46. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 904
(3d Cir. 1969); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1961).
1977]
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procedural,47 evidentiary48 and even substantive4 advantages con-
ferred upon a registrant, but cancellation cannot be equated with
invalidation of a trademark, which amounts to confiscation of a
valuable property right50
D. Enjoining Use of a Trademark
The FTC has enjoined the use of trademarks in a number
of cases. Such injunctions go beyond cancellation of registrations
as they directly affect trademark ownership. Nevertheless, the cases
do not go so far as to support the remedy of compulsory trade-
mark licensing for antitrust violations.
It has consistently been held that the use of a trademark may
not be prohibited if a remedy less drastic than an injunction will
accomplish the same result.-" As a practical matter, this principle
severely limits the instances in which compulsory licensing will
be an appropriate remedy for a violation of antitrust law. Further-
more, injunctions have been issued only where a trademark was
found to be inherently defective and incapable of exclusive appro-
priation because it deceived the public by misrepresenting the
nature or quality, 2 geographic origin,53 official sanction, 4 or asso-
47. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117, 1121 (1970) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970).
48. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115 (a), 1157 (b) (1970). See also Pic Design Corp. v. Bearings
Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1971); Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All
window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Mater.
nity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1956); Rolley v. Younghusband, 204 F.2d 209,
211 (9th Cir. 1953).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1072, 1115 (b), 1124 (1970).
50. One commentator has suggested that the ineffectiveness of tancellation of regis.
tration accounts for the FTC's infrequent resort to section 14. Stockell, Federal Trade
Commission and Trademarks, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 500, 502-03 (1964).
51. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) ; Elliot Knitwear, Inc.
v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1959); Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 437,
442 (7th Cir. 1940); Century Metalcraft Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1940);
FTC v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F.2d 70, 72 (6th Cir. 1930); N. Fluegelman & Co. v. FTC, 37
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1930); Masland Duraleather Co. v. FTC, 34 F.2d 733, 738 (3d Cir.
1929).
52. Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Carter Prod., Inc.
v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v.
FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir.
1944), rev'd, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676,
678 (2d Cir. 1944); Irwin v. FTC, 143 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1944).
53. Howe v. FTC, 148 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945); El
Moro Cigar Co. v. FTC, 107 F.2d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 1939); H.N. Heusner & Son v. FTC,
106 F.2d 596, 597 (3d Cir. 1939).
54. Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944
(1963); C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, 197 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1952); Lighthouse Rug
Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1929).
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ciation with a source of goods.55 None of the cases involved allega-
tions that a trademark had been used to violate antitrust or any
other law.
The difference is crucial. Invalidation of an inherently defec-
tive trademark works no undue hardship and, indeed, safeguards
the public from deception; invalidation of an otherwise valid,
albeit misused, trademark, however, requires a finding that the
interests promoted by invalidation outweigh trademark interests.
Finally, an injunction operates in a fundamentally different
fashion from compulsory licensing. When use of a trademark is
banned, the prohibition is comprehensive. No one may make use
of an inherently defective trademark, and such a trademark will
not appear in the marketplace, at least not in connection with a
particular class of goods. Compulsory licensing, on the other hand,
expands use of a trademark in the marketplace by making it
freely available to all makers or sellers of a product.
E. Trademarks and Advertising
A trademark is the principal device used in advertising a
product. A great deal of the dissatisfaction with and opposition to
trademarks arises, therefore, from a belief that advertising is in-
imical to the public interest.5 It has been asserted that advertis-
ing affects the public adversely by inordinately influencing con-
sumer demand, that the creation of such demand restrains com-
petition, and that competition may be restored by reducing the
effectiveness of trademarks or by actually invalidating them.5 7
From this perspective, compulsory licensing may be viewed as an
appropriate remedy for an antitrust violation.
Attempts to justify compulsory trademark licensing in terms
of the effect of advertising on consumer choice raise serious an-
alytical difficulties. First, a distinction must be drawn between a
trademark and its use in advertising. Second, a distinction must
be drawn between legitimate advertising and advertising that
55. Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883
(1960); Galter v. FTC, 186 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 818 (1951);
FTC v. Real Prod. Corp., 90 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937).
56. See Greenbaum, Trademarks Attacked, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 443, 444 (1968);
Joyce, Challenge to the Trademark System, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 453, 454 (1968); Comment,
supra note 17, at 648-50.
57. See Comment, supra note 17, at 661-66.
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prejudices public opinion. Third, the promotion of irrational
consumer choice must be conceptually distinguished from con-
sumer preferences which result in monopoly power. Finally, the
differences between an organized response to the abuse of ad-
vertising and compulsory licensing of trademarks must be recog-
nized.
From such an analysis5" it becomes apparent that much of the
dissatisfaction with trademarks is in reality a reaction to their use
to create irrational consumer demand through advertising; that
use of a trademark to create irrational consumer demand through
advertising rarely amounts to misuse sufficient to create monopoly
power; that compulsory licensing is not a reasonable response to
the creation of irrational consumer demand through advertising
not amounting to misuse of a trademark sufficient to create mo-
nopoly power; and, that the appropriateness of compulsory li-
censing of a trademark as a remedy for a violation of antitrust
law can be evaluated only by considering the case in which a
trademark is actually used to violate antitrust law.
F. Summary
It has been shown that each of the five suggested justifications
for compulsory trademark licensing for antitrust violations creates
serious conceptual problems. Even if one or more of the preceding
rationales is arguably acceptable, however, the remedy of compul-
sory licensing should not be imposed without full consideration
of the effects of that remedy upon important trademark interests.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING AND TRADEMARK INTERESTS
A trademark is used to promote four important interests.
This section examines the impact of compulsory licensing on each
of these.
A. A Trademark is Used to Indicate the Source or Origin of
Goods
The primary purpose of a trademark, and the earliest recog-
58. See text accompanying notes 74-77 & 99-100 infra.
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nized at law,59 is to identify goods or services as those of a partic-
ular manufacturer or merchant and to distinguish them from the
goods or services of others.60 The United States Supreme Court
recognized this principle a century ago.1 Today the Lanham Act62
defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or
any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others.163
As an indicator or source, a trademark serves both private
(commercial) and public (consumer) interests. A business that
employs a term as a trademark acquires an exclusive right to
use that term as a badge of identification and may prevent others
from using terms likely to be confused with it." Upon the strength
of this right, an entrepreneur may safely enter the marketplace
and meet existing competition, while an established firm may con-
tinue66 to operate and profit from the goodwill that is associated
59. See Thomas v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837); 1 H. NIms, supra
note 1, §§ 16-26, at 83-137, § 186, at 514-16. For discussion of the history of trademarks, see
generally 1-2 J. McCARTiiy, supra note 11; Behrendt, Trademarks and Monopolies-His-
torical and Conceptual Foundations, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 853 (1961); Beyerling, Trade-
Marks-Their Origin and Development, 32 TRADEMARK BuLL. (n.s.) 256 (1937); Daniels,
Words Worth Millions-Their Origin and Ancestry, 23 TRADEMARK BULL. (n.s.) 183
(1928); Daniels. The History of the Trade-Mark, 7 TRADEMARK BuLL. (ns.) 239
(1911); Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK RE'. 265
(1975); Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 876
(1951); Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 531 (1969); Rus-
ton, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADE ARK REP. 127 (1953); Treece, Development
in The Law of Trademarks and Services, 58 CAUF. L. REv. 885 (1970).
60. A trademark need not identify a manufacturer or merchant by name, but may
indicate merely that an anonymous establishment is a source of goods or services. Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963).
61. In McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 248 (1877), the owner of the trademark
"Dr. McLane's Liver Pills" sought an injunction and damages for the use of the allegedly
confusing similar term "Dr. C. McLane's Celebrated Liver Pills." The Court awarded
only equitable relief, owing to plaintiff's delay in bringing suit, but Mr. Justice Clifford
set out the common law rule:
[A] trade-mark may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the goods
he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold
by another ....
Id. at 254.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
64. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916); 1 H. NiMs,
supra note 1, § 187, at 516. The right is limited to use of a term as a trademark and does
not bar another's use of a term in a descriptive manner. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1970).
65. The test for trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion. McLean v. Flem-
ing, 96 U.S. at 251; 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) (1970).
66. Trademark rights endure as long as a trademark is lawfully used. Federal regis-
trations may be renewed every twenty years for as long as a trademark is so used. 15 U.S.C.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
with its ingenuity and investment and symbolized by its trade-
mark.6
7
Every consumer relies upon trademarks to distinguish the
goods of one business from those of another.68 The law recognizes
and protects consumers by proscribing the use of trademarks that
are likely to confuse the public as to the source of goods. 9 Indeed,
the primary purpose of the law of trademarks and unfair competi-
tion"° is to prevent public confusion,71 and a business' trademark
rights are conceived of in terms of this public interest72 Compul-
sory licensing, however, can only impair the ability of a trademark
to serve this purpose. In the hands of more than one business,
a trademark cannot identify the source of a product, and thus is
certain to confuse consumers.
The law recognizes that a consumer's right to be safeguarded
from confusion goes beyond the right not to be injured econom-
ically, as by the sale of inferior merchandise under a trademark too
nearly resembling that of a reputable firm. A consumer has a right
not to be misled as to the origin of goods. As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged,
If consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a given article because
it was made by a particular manufacturer or class of manufac-
turers, they have a right to do so, and this right cannot be satisfied
§ 1059 (1970). The use of certain trademarks, such as "C & C" for soft drinks, for over a
century attests to the enduring nature of the right.
67. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). A business
that owns a trademark recognizes its value and lists it as an asset. "Coca-Cola," one of
the three best known trademarks according to the court in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), was valued at $100,000,000 as early as
1932. For discussions of the valuation of trademarks generally, see Vancil v. Anderson,
227 P.2d 74 (Idaho 1951); Levene v. City of Salem, 229 P.2d 255 (Ore. 1951); Clark v.
Lucas County Bd. of Review, 44 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1950); Davies, The Valuation of Good
Will as Affected by Personal Abilities, Attributes, Skill, Acquaintanceships, and Other Per-
sonal Characteristics of Individuals, 31 NEB. L. REv. 559 (1942); Lyons, Valuation of Good
Will and Covenant Not to Compete: How To Distinguish Between Them, 16 J. TAx 228
(1962); Soper, Certain Accounting and Tax Aspects of Patents, Trade-Marks and Copy-
rights, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 296 (1953); Note, Valuation of Good Will for Tax Purposes,
48 VA. L. Rlv. 1274 (1962).
68. The benefits of this freedom of choice to both the consumer and the economy
are discussed in sections II-B and II-C of this article. See text accompanying notes 82-83
& 91-92 infra.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. Trademark law is part of the broader law of unfair competition. Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at 413; S. Ra. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in
[1946] U.S. CODE CONG. : AD. Navs 1274, 1275.
71. American Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1925).
72. Vitascope Co. v. U.S. Phonograph Co., 83 F. 30 (C.C.D.N.J. 1897).
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by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one as equally
good, but having a different origin.73
Many critics question the importance of this right, however,
and suggest that where goods are the same or substantially the
same, the use of a trademark to insure brand preference creates
an artificial distinction among goods in the mind of a consumer. 4
A consumer with an irrational preference for a brand of goods is
said to buy out of habit and to ignore the merits of a competing
offer. Thus, his interests are said to be adversely affected by the
use of a trademark. Nevertheless, public injury in the form of
irrational consumer choice is a limited harm, and does not justify
in any way compulsory licensing of a trademark7 5 which destroys
the trademark's value as an indicator of source.
A consumer's right to select from the goods of different manu-
facturers or merchants is a basic freedom of choice not to be taken
lightly. Serious doubts surround any suggestion that the public
ought to be protected from itself by eliminating opportunity for
choice. Certainly, some compelling interest must be advanced
before freedom of choice may be abrogated, and that interest must
be at least equal to the right to prefer one manufacturer or mer-
chant to another. It seems doubtful that preventing some irrational
decision-making alone qualifies as a compelling interest.7 6
More important, a consumer's selection of goods by means of
trademarks serves several useful and necessary purposes in a com-
petitive economic system. The selective process should not be
disturbed without providing a substitute. If buying by brand is
to be curtailed or abandoned, some form of government regula-
tion of the production and sale of goods must be adopted in its
78. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1983), quoted in FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 388 (1965). See also FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67,
78 (1934).
74. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 65.3, at 12-14. Borden, involving processed
lemon juice, is a case in point. See slip op. at 60-65. Conceivably, a consumer could pur-
chase goods inferior to competing goods solely on account of brand preference.
75. See Lebow, Is The Trade-Mark Declining as a Marketing Tool?, 40 TRADEMRK
RE. 770 (1950).
76. Discussions of the relationship between irrational consumer choice and excessive
goodwill amounting to monopoly power tend to blur any distinction between the two con-
cepts. See, e.g., 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 2.2, at 36. Irrational consumer choice, as
used here, means a brand preference that is not rationally related to the merits of the
brand. Excessive goodwill amounting to monopoly power may be entirely unrelated to
consumer irrationality.
77. See text accompanying notes 82-83 & 91-92 infra.
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stead. Compulsory licensing, occasioned by unpredictable viola-
tions of antitrust law, bears no relation to a comprehensive system
of government regulation, carefully considered and legislated by
Congress. On the contrary, an occasional court order to license a
trademark posits a system in which one trademark identifies source
while another does not.
In such a system a consumer could not distinguish between
a valid and an invalidated trademark. Either he would be unable
to rely on any trademarks, which would leave him without ade-
quate means of selection, or he would have to assume the risk of
relying on a term that does not indicate the source he would other-
wise anticipate. Avoiding this dilemma justifies the injury oc-
casioned by irrational consumer choice.
B. A Trademark Is Used as A Vehicle for Quality
A relationship exists between a trademark and the quality
of the goods it identifies. In order to understand the nature of
this relationship and the effect compulsory licensing has on it, one
must consider at the outset what a trademark is not. Despite oc-
casional language to the contrary,78 a trademark is not a guarantor
of the quality of the goods it identifies.
It was long held that a trademark could not be licensed with-
out transferring title to a business on the grounds that to do so
would separate the symbol from the activity that gave it value.70
This limitation was vitiated when it was recognized that licensing
a trademark together with the goodwill it symbolizes preserves
the integrity of the symbol. A link between a trademark and the
quality of goods was forged from this change in the law and, spe-
cifically, from the need to reconcile the identification function
of a trademark with the modern practice of licensing a trademark
to more than one entity, particularly in a franchising operation."
78. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791,794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
79. Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1905); MacMahan Pharma-
cal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1901); 1 H. Niras, supra
note 1, § 22, at 130-31.
80. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972) ; Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1006 (1967); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366-69
(2d Cir. 1959); Grismore, The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 30 MCi
L. R v. 489, 498 (1932); Isaacs, Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HAv. L. REV. 1210, 1218-19
(1931) ; Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchise Arrangements,
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Licensing a trademark is justified within the traditional
framework of trademark law by requiring a licensee to conform
in the production and sale of goods to standards of quality estab-
lished and enforced by the licensor. Although in reality it may
be used by several producers or merchants, the trademark identifies
a single source in that all goods are made and sold in compliance
with a single set of standards enforced by a licensor.
The role a trademark plays in assuring quality is incidental
to the accommodation of traditional trademark concepts and mod-
em business practice, and it is misleading to consider the relation-
ship between a trademark and the quality of goods apart from this
accommodation. In fact, a trademark cannot guarantee that the
goods of a licensee will meet a standard of quality. Only the care-
ful selection and continued supervision of a licensee by a licensor
insures that the former will perform in accordance with standards.,'
And clearly, outside the framework of a licensing situation, a trade-
mark does little if anything to insure that the goods of a single
manufacturer or merchant meet even minimal standards of quality
or are of uniform grade or kind.
What a trademark can and does do is provide a business,
whether a single enterprise or a group of licensed users of a trade-
mark, with an incentive for the adoption, maintenance and im-
provement of quality standards by enabling the consumer to iden-
tify goods as coming from a single source 2 and permitting him to
accept or reject those goods on the basis of how well they suit his
needs.3 Thus understood, a trademark may aptly be termed a
vehicle for quality, but it is misleading to think of it as a guar-
antor of quality.
As a vehicle for quality, a trademark loses its value when it
is licensed involuntarily, whether or not quality standards are in-
corporated in a compulsory license. If compulsory licensing is
carried out and quality standards are not adopted and enforced,
116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 435, 445 (1968). See also Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HAIv. L. REv. 813, 823 (1927); Shuman, The Future of Franchising and
Trade Regulation, 14 How. L.J. 60, 62 (1968).
81. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d at 367; Huber Baking Co.
v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 110 U.S. Pat. Q. 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1958); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1970).
82. A "single" source may include a "single group" of licensees, all of whom, in
order to maintain their status, comply with production and marketing standards pre-
scribed and enforced by a single licensor.
83. See generally Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARv. L. REv. 885, 896 n.588 (1955).
1977]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
even minimal standards cannot be anticipated. Even if compulsory
licensing is carried out in accordance with quality standards in-
corporated in a license,8 4 two factors militate against any likelihood
of continued quality.
First, it is doubtful that even minimal standards set out in
a compulsory license can be adequately maintained. A licensor,
who can neither select a licensee nor justifiably terminate a rela-
tionship with it, cannot enforce standards of quality, even as-
suming that there will be any incentive to do so. A compulsory
license therefore requires an independent party charged with
administration, 5 but such a party is likely to lack both the knowl-
edge and the resources to perform this task effectively. It is well
known that "quality control in cases of multiple non-exclusive
licensing places . .. a heavy burden on the organizational han-
dling of the license,"' 8 6 and it is unrealistic to believe that this
burden can be borne by an independent party.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, because quality standards
set out in a compulsory license are fixed, they are not subject to
the progressive change that a trademark naturally insures. Under
a compulsory license, potentially all producers of a product manu-
facture under a common title. No single producer has any incen-
tive to improve the quality of its product when such improvement
is as likely to be ascribed to a competitor as to itself. On the other
hand, any single producer who manufactures an inferior product
injures the reputation of all who make the same product under a
common designation. Thus, a trademark, as a vehicle of quality,
is utterly worthless when licensed mandatorily.
It is no answer to the defects inherent in compulsory licensing
that the law readily permits voluntary licensing of a trademark.
A clear distinction between the two must be drawn. In the case
84. The order in Borden provides that "licenses may contain provisions ...provid-
ing for reasonable quality control standards for the production of reconstituted lemon
juice by licensees, equal to the quality of respondent Borden's ReaLemon reconstituted
lemon juice." Slip op. at 167-68, 3 TRADE REG. RaP. $ 21,194, at 21,108.
85. The order in Borden provides that "quality control standards shall be admin-
istered by an independent third party." Id. at 168, reprinted in 3 TRADE R G . REP.
21,194, at 21,109.
86. Behrendt, Trademarks and Monopolies-Historical and Conceptual Foundations,
51 TRADE MARK REP. 853, 863 (1961). See also Hoffmann, Problems Encountered in Per-
mitting Use of a Trade Name by Subsidiaries, Licensees and Distributors, 62 TRADEMARK
REP. 28 (1972); Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Control, 59
TRADEMARK RaP. 820 (1969).
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of a voluntary license, the licensor and licensee may properly be
thought of as constituting an economic community of interest. Use
of a trademark by a related company inures to the benefit of the
trademark proprietor. 7 Quality standards adopted and effectively
implemented by a voluntary licensor safeguard the public.88 Often,
advertising is jointly adopted by members of the community of
interest; such promotion benefits each of them. " Finally, the busi-
ness as a whole operating under a common trademark competes
in the marketplace with other businesses.90 None of these factors
is present in a situation where one business is compelled to yield
its trademark to competitors.
C. A Trademark Is Used to Promote Competition
A trademark promotes competition by enabling a consumer
to select from the goods of competing manufacturers or mer-
chantsY A business that satisfies consumer demand is rewarded
by continued patronage. The ability of a business to attract and
satisfy the buying public is a measure of its capacity to compete
in the marketplace and may be defined as its goodwill. Goodwill,
in turn, "requires visible symbols to keep it alive, e.g., trade-
marks."92
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1970).
88. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
89. See Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 872, 876 (D.
Minn. 1971) , aff'd, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972).
90. See Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir. 1976).
91. Congress acknowledged this principle in reporting that "[t]rademarks ... are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles
by enabling a buyer to distinguish one from the other." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [19 4 6] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1274, 1275. See Smith v. Chanel,
Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American
Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 820 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969); Standard Oil Co.
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th Cir. 1966); Brock, Merchandising
Value of Trademarks, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 701, 702-03 (1952); Brown, Advertising Re-
quirements of Trademarks, 44 TRADEMARK RE. 794, 796 (1954); Brown, Advertising and
the Public Interest; Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185-86 (1948);
Jackson, Comments on the Safeguarding of the Trademark System, 41 TRADEMARK RaP.
512, 516 (1951); Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in
the Market Place, 64 TRADEMARK REPt. 75, 95 (1974); Pattishal, Trade-Marks and the
Monopoly Phobia, 50 MicH. L. REv. 967, 970-71 (1952); Rogers, The Lanham Act and
the Social Functions of Trademarks, 14 LAiW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 174-75 (1949);
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 818-19
(1927); Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1174-75 (1963).
92. 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 2.2, at 36.
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As unfettered competition rarely is completely fair,°3 excessive
goodwill may prove damaging in a system that depends on compe-
tition to determine market share. As a symbol of goodwill, a trade-
mark can be used to acquire and maintain monopoly power. Where
there exists little or no difference between a dominant brand of
product and competing goods, it is tempting to conclude that
goodwill, as symbolized by a trademark, functions prejudicially.
However, "[w]here . . . monopoly has been obtained through
other means, goodwill is of little or no importance." 94
Where a trademark is not misused, it promotes competition,
and therefore furthers precisely the interest that antitrust law is
intended to preserve. By preventing its exclusive appropriation
and use as a symbol of goodwill in the marketplace, however,
compulsory licensing destroys a trademark as a promoter of com-
petition, and thus impairs both trademark and antitrust interests
in those cases where trademarks have not been misused.
D. A Trademark Is Used as a Focus of Advertising
In addition to its other functions, a trademark facilitates ad-
vertising. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made
this point clearly in Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic
Co9r where it observed:
A trade-mark is but a species of advertising, its purpose being to
fix the identity of the article and the name of the producer in the
minds of the people who see the advertisement, so that they may
afterward use the knowledge themselves and carry it to others hav-
ing like desires and needs for such article.90
Millions of dollars are spent annually by businesses to pro-
mote products and to permit consumer choice among a panoply of
competing goodsY Invariably, a trademark serves as the focus of
93. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITAISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962).
94. 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 10, § 2.2, at 36.
95. 18 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1927).
96. Id. at 774. See also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571-72 (10th
Cir. 1946); Potter-Wrightington, Inc. v. Ward Baking Co., 288 F. 597, 600-01 (D. Mass.
1923), aff'd, 298 F. 398 (1st Cir. 1924); R.STATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 715, Comment
b, at 554-55 (1938) ; Brown, Advertising Requirements of Trademarks, 44 TItADEMARx RrP.
794 (1954); Lebow, supra note 75, at 771.




advertising, insuring that expenditures inure to the benefit of the
advertiser and not a competitor. Moreover, it has been recognized
that a trademark promotes both private and public interests in
advertising even when the goods it identifies are similar or identi-
cal to those of othersY8 In short, safeguarding the integrity of a
trademark is synonymous with preserving its advertising value.
While recognizing the legitimate role a trademark plays in
making advertising possible, some courts and commentators have
criticized the way in which a trademark helps to promote the sale
of goods. Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that "[t]he creation of
a market through an established symbol implies that people float
on a psychological current engendered by the various advertising
devices which give a trade-mark its potency." 99 Others have gone
further and argued that the persuasive nature of advertising exerts
an undue influence on the public and that, since a trademark facili-
tates such advertising, the trademark itself has an adverse impact
on the public.10 °
Counter arguments abound.'0 ' While it may be too simple to
say that the problem is "of more interest to the sociologist than to
the lawyer,"'01 2 support can certainly be found for the value of ad-
vertising. 0 3 Even where it contributes to irrational decision making
by somewhat coloring consumer choice, a trademark is not so de-
void of value that it may be invalidated. 04 Only when it is used to
acquire excessive goodwill can the value of a trademark as a focus
of advertising be doubted. 0 5
98. See Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 F. 566, 568 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
99. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 208
(1942).
100. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 567. See also J.K. GALBRArrH, THE NEW
INDUSTRUAL STATE 200, 208 (1967); Deering, Trademarks on Non-Competitive Products, 36
ORE. L. REv. 1, 2 (1956).
101. See J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COIPETrTION 38 (1967); 1 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 11, § 2:14(c), at 82-83; Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181 (1948).
102. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 3:15, at 96.
103. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967), stated, "Undeniably advertising may sometimes be used to create irrational brand
preferences and mislead consumers as to the actual differences between products, but it
is very difficult to discover at what point advertising ceases to be an aspect of healthy
competition." Id. at 603 (Harlan, J., concurring).
104. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.




Compulsory trademark licensing is intended to and succeeds
in placing a trademark in the hands of more than one manufac-
turer or merchant. The result is that no business can use such a
trademark to identify its product as emanating from a single
source, or to distinguish it from the products of others. Further-
more, no business can invest in promoting its product under such
a trademark; the public cannot exert pressure on business to main-
tain and increase standards of quality in a product identified by
such a trademark; and competition, as furthered by a trademark,
is curtailed.
The consequences of compulsory licensing are invalidation
of a trademark and irreparable harm to trademark interests. From
a trademark perspective, these consequences may appear most
acceptable where a trademark symbolizes goodwill to such an
extent that it interferes with competition or where it is used in
advertising to acquire unlawful power in the marketplace. From
an antitrust perspective, these consequences may appear not only
most acceptable, but most necessary, where a trademark is so
misused.
It is tempting to conclude that both trademark and antitrust
law sanction invalidation of a trademark by means of compulsory
licensing in a case where one product sold under a trademark
enjoys a dominant market position. In fact, much greater attention
must be paid to the interests sought to be preserved and promoted
by both branches of the law.
III. BALANCING ANTITRUST AND TRADEMARK INTERESTS
A. Antitrust and Trademark Law
Whether compulsory licensing of a trademark is an appro-
priate remedy for a violation of antitrust law raises the question
of whether the remedy's injurious impact on trademark interests
is outweighed by some countervailing antitrust interest. In answer-
ing this question, it is essential to consider the relationship between
antitrust and trademark law.
How to balance antitrust and trademark interests has proved
a thorny problem. As one leading commentator has observed,
"[t]here is a great deal of confusion over what, if any, relationship
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exists between the antitrust laws and the laws against unfair com-
petition."'10 1 Part of the confusion follows from a perceived conflict
between the origins and purposes of two different branches of the
law, while part stems from a basic misunderstanding of the nature
of trademark law.
The underlying principle of antitrust law is the promotion
of competition. 10 7 Trademark law, as part of the law of unfair
competition, grows out of concerns with the nature of competitive
conduct. 108 In simplest terms, antitrust law is intended to keep
competition free while trademark law is designed to make it fair.109
An apparent conflict between antitrust and trademark law
arises if regulations designed to control unfair trade practices are
viewed as restrictions on otherwise free competition. This is not
the perspective from which antitrust law operates. On the contrary,
antitrust law recognizes that entirely unregulated competition is
not truly free and that unfair trade practices interfere with the
operation of a competitive system. When the relationship between
antitrust and trademark law is viewed in this light, it becomes
apparent that "antitrust law and unfair competition law reflect
the judicial system's method of both preserving and controlling
competition.... [T]hey are complimentary and not inconsistent
in any way.""'
There is by no means complete agreement as to the harmony
between antitrust and trademark law. A surprising number of
critics maintain that a trademark is a monopoly and, as such,
violative of antitrust law."' This view reflects a lack of under-
standing of trademark law and the meaning of the term monopoly
as it is used in the trademark context. A leading commentator has
explained the problem:
106. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 1:14, at 29.
107. See 15 US.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27 (1970).
108. See generally 1 H. NIMs, supra note 1, §§ 1, 3, at 1-16, 27-29.
109. Handler, Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws, 8 TRADEMARK REP. 887 (1948).
110. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 1:14, at 80. See also Handler, Sharing in Good-
will: A Tort or a Constitutional Privilege?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1186 (1964).
111. See the opinions of Judge Jerome Frank in Triangle Pub., Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167
F.2d 969, 974-83 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d
84, 87-48 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd.,
187 F.2d 955, 957-58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 U.S. 776 (1943). See also E. CHAMBER-
LAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1962); Timberg, Trade-




[T]he term "monopoly" is used in two quite different senses. One
kind of "monopoly" is market power acquired by private agree-
ment resulting in a restraint of trade. This kind of true economic
monopoly is the subject of the antitrust laws. The other kind of
"monopoly" is a legally-sanctioned exclusive right defined by
government and the courts.1 12
The weight of authority favors the proposition that a trade-
mark is not a monopoly as that term is used in antitrust law."
It is incorrect and misleading to view antitrust and trademark
law as incompatible or to permit semantics to overshadow the
essentially complementary nature of these two branches of the
law. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently stated:
Neither the Supreme Court, nor this Circuit, has gone so far as to
presume that the mere existence of a trademark in and of itself
supplies economic power sufficient to constitute an antitrust vio-
lation .... [A] legally unique name alone cannot demand a pre-
sumption of economic power. 14
B. Use of a Trademark to Violate Antitrust Law
Although a trademark ordinarily confers an entirely lawful
"monopoly" (if that term must be used), and actually facilitates
competition, it nevertheless may be used to violate antitrust law.
The Lanham Act" 5 recognizes that a trademark may be misused
and provides a defendant in a trademark infringement action with
the defense "that the mark has been or is being used to violate
the antitrust laws of the United States." 116
Considerable debate surrounded this section in the Lanham
112. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 1:6, at 36-37. See also 1 H. NIMs, supra note
1, § 190a, at 525-26.
113. S. Rap. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 1274, 1275. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98
(1918); Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968, 975 (W.D. Mo.
1966) (quoting Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966));
United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1950); National Fruit Prod. Co. V. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F.
Supp. 499, 506-07 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944); S. OPPENuEIM &
G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTrrRusr LAWS 772 (3d ed. 1968); E. ROGERS, GOODWILL, TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 51--52 (1914); Pattishall, supra note 91, at 968.
114. Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d at 48.
115. 15 U.S.C.§§ 1051-1127 (1970).
116. Id. § 1115(b)(7) (1970).
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Act. 117 Even after enactment of the new trademark law, it was
argued, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States," 8 that a
trademark should be accorded special status and a violation of
antitrust law excused as being actively ancillary to the maintenance
of a trademark licensing arrangement. The Supreme Court re-
j ected this position, pointing out that section 33(b) (7)" 19 of the Lan-
ham Act explicitly recognizes a trademark's capacity for harm120
While acknowledging the dangers of trademark abuse, the
courts have been uniformly cautious in impairing the value of a
trademark in order to promote antitrust interests. The restrained
handling of a trademark in an anticompetitive situation results
in the prevailing rule that the use of a trademark will not be held
to violate antitrust law unless it is the instrument by which the
violation has been carried out.
In Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co.,' 21
a district court found such misuse of a trademark as to suggest
that it might be appropriate to order cancellation of certain trade-
mark registrations. This extraordinary remedy, a direct attack on
the value of a registration, if not of a trademark, was suggested by
flagrant abuse of trademark rights in the furtherance of an anti-
competitive scheme. Specifically, defendants, producers of jewelry,
entered into licenses throughout the country "as a means of secur-
ing ... a monopoly of the insignia goods business of all of the
college fraternities and sororities in the United States ... with the
intended result that [they] should be the only manufacturers,
distributors, and vendors in the United States of items bearing
fraternity... trademarks.' '122 In furtherance of this plan, a group
of fraternities and sororities secured federal registrations of their
"trademarks"-their insignia-and used them in bringing trade-
mark infringement actions against would-be competitors of the
defendants.
In suggesting that such a scheme might justify the cancellation
of registrations, the court acknowledged the role trademarks played
in the plan as a whole. Not only were the federal rights granted
117. See Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Patents,
U.S. Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-71 (Nov. 15-16, 1944).
118. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1970).
120. 341 U.S. at 599 (1953).
121. 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
122. Id. at 971.
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under the trademark statute used to thwart those rights sought
to be preserved by another law, but the value of defendants' busi-
ness was inextricably bound up with the value of the trademarks-
defendants' goods would be virtually worthless without the in-
signia of the fraternities and sororities. 23
The principle of Phi Delta Theta became the rule of Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena.24 In that trademark in-
fringement case, defendant sought unsuccessfully to avail itself
of section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act. 25 The court found num-
erous violations of antitrust law by plaintiff, but denied defendant's
defense on the strength of Phi Delta Theta, stating that "[a]n essen-
tial element of the antitrust misuse defense in a trademark case
is proof that the mark itself has been the basic and fundamental
vehicle required and used to accomplish the violation.' ' 20
Judicial reluctance to impair the value of a trademark is also
reflected in a restrained approach to the fashioning of remedies
intended to cure antitrust violations. The Supreme Court in
Timken, after finding that the defendant had violated sections 1
and 3 of the Sherman Act2 7 by means of various anticompetitive
practices, including division of territories and price-fixing, granted
an injunction against such practices, but did not order divesti-
ture.'28 Divestiture of a part of defendant's business would have
diminished the value of defendant's trademark to the extent that
it represented goodwill.
The Court had reached a similar result in United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.' In that pre-Lanham Act case, de-
fendant Soft-Lite was found to have violated sections 1 and 3 of
the Sherman Act ' 30 by means of price-fixing and the imposition
of various vertical restrictions in operating its distribution system.
The Court observed that "as Soft-Lite limits itself to distribution
only, the trade name, salesmanship and business experience of
Soft-Lite are the qualities upon which it must primarily depend
123. Id.
124. 298 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(7) (1970).
126. 298 F. Supp. at 1315. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d
366, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922.
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1970).
128. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. at 601.
129. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1970).
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for its profits as a distributor."'' Nevertheless, it specifically re-
jected the government's contention that the defendant should be
compelled to sell its goods to all would-be purchasers rather than
to selected links in its distributive chain.132 Forcing Soft-Lite to
sell to all would-be purchasers would have seriously diminished
the value of its trademark by reducing its control over the trade-
mark's use.
Both Timken and Bausch & Lomb presented the Court with
opportunities to correct anticompetitive conditions by impairing
the value of a trademark. In Timken, the trademark was used
in a licensing program, the operation of which resulted in viola-
tions of antitrust law. Attorneys for defendants placed the trade-
mark on the line, so to speak, by suggesting that its presence
justified otherwise illegal practices. Nevertheless, the Court adopted
a cautious approach and did nothing to diminish the value of a
trademark. In Bausch & Lomb the Court specifically recognized
the importance of a trademark (trade name) in defendant's dis-
tributive chain, but concluded that other violations of antitrust
law should be enjoined.
Judicial reluctance to impair the value of trademarks has
persisted. In FTC v. Procter 6 Gamble Co.,' 3' defendant, the na-
tion's leading advertiser, sought to acquire Clorox, a national
leader in the production and sale of laundry bleach. The Supreme
Court concluded that a proposed merger between defendant and
Clorox would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act,'134 and as a
consequence, condemned the merger 35
In reaching this result, the Court noted that Clorox was al-
ready the leader in its field, that its trademark was consequently
well known and that, aided by defendant's extraordinary adver-
tising capacity, it might prove a barrier to entry into the bleach
market. 3 Despite these observations, the Court took no action to
impair the value of the "Clorox" trademark. Rather, it enjoined
the merger. Whereas both defendant and the "Clorox" trademark
forfeited whatever added value might have resulted from extensive
advertising of "Clorox" by defendant, the existing value of the
131. 321 U.S. at 710.
132. Id. at 728-29.
133. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
134. 15 US.C. § 7 (1970).
135. 386 U.S. at 604 (concurring opinion).
136. Id. at 579.
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trademark, to both Clorox and the public, was not impaired.
Similarly, in Ford Motor Co. v. United States,13 7 the Supreme
Court, confronting a powerful trademark as well as anticompetitive
conduct, chose to cure violations of antitrust law without damag-
ing the trademark. In Ford, the Court held that a merger between
the nation's second largest automobile manufacturer and Auto-
lite, a leading producer of spark plugs, violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 3 8 The Court ordered Ford's divestiture of Autolite
and went beyond the decision in Procter & Gamble in refusing to
permit Ford to use its own trademark on spark plugs for a period
of five years. 3 9 Ford lost whatever value the "Autolite" trademark
would have represented in its hands as well as any potential in-
crease in the value of its existing trademark which might have
resulted from a successful trade in spark plugs. On the other hand,
neither trademark was irreparably damaged, and neither ceased
to serve the public.140
The courts have expressed the view that a trademark, although
subject to misuse, should be protected. This attitude is reflected
in judicial reluctance to attribute a violation of antitrust law to
misuse of a trademark and restraint in the fashioning of remedies
intended to cure violations.
C. Compulsory Licensing and the Balance Between Antitrust
and Trademark Interests
The purposes of antitrust and trademark law are essentially
complementary. It is misleading to brand a trademark a monopoly
without distinguishing between the meanings that term has in
,wo different legal contexts. Where a trademark is misused to
violate antitrust law, appropriate steps may be taken to end abuses.
The courts, however, consistently have recognized the value of a
trademark, and have proceeded with caution both in finding
misuse of a trademark and in adopting a remedy which might im-
pair that value.
137. 405 US. 562 (1972).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
139. 405 U.S. at 575-76. In Procter & Gamble, the Court had suggested that de-
fendant's entry into the bleach market would promote competition. 326 U.S. at 580-81.
140. See also Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 89, 48 (7th Cir. 1961); Cott
Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 146 F. Supp. 300, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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Compulsory trademark licensing is an unwarranted departure
from a tradition of judicial restraint long practiced to promote the
law's careful balancing of antitrust and trademark interests. The
principles established by the cases may be reduced to two rules.
The first is that where misuse of a trademark is' not the cause of
a violation of antitrust law, it is inappropriate to adopt a remedy
that interferes with trademark interests.14' The record in a case
must clearly establish that misuse of a trademark and not some
other form of antitrust abuse is responsible for a violation of
antitrust law before trademark interests can be jeopardized. 42 To
hold otherwise is to upset the careful balance between antitrust
and trademark interests.
The second rule may be drawn from the cases and supported
by reason. Even where it is shown that misuse of a trademark is
the cause of a violation of antitrust law, it is inappropriate to
adopt a remedy that invalidates the trademark. This rule follows
from the nature of the wrong. Not the trademark, but its misuse,
is the cause of a violation of antitrust law. Consequently, an appro-
priate remedy ought to end misuse while safeguarding a trademark
in order to preserve a legitimate balance between antitrust and
trademark interests.
Compulsory licensing does not merely end misuse. Rather,
it invalidates a trademark by placing it in the hands of more than
one business, thus rendering it worthless as a trademark. This
result upsets the balance between antitrust and trademark interests
which the law encourages.
It has been argued, however, that a trademark's misuse justi-
fies its invalidation, even where some less drastic remedy directed
141. The opinion in Borden identifies several anti-competitive practices engaged in
by the respondent:
These acts and practices included geographically discriminatory prices, promo-
tional allowances tailored to combat competition in particular areas where
competition had arisen, granting to selected key retail stores special allowances
designed to eliminate, hinder or restrict sales of competitive processed lemon
juices, and taking steps selectively to reduce the retail price of its premium
priced product to a level so low as to make it virtually impossible for other
producers of processed lemon juice to sell their products at prices above their
own cost.
Slip op. at 156.
142. Doubt should be resolved in favor of trademark interests, and the need to
interfere with those interests should be demonstrated by an exhaustion of alternative
remedies, so that there may be an end to abuses without affecting rights to which the
public has a legitimate concern. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707, 728-29 (1944).
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at the evil sought to be cured will suffice to restore competition.
This argument fails by focusing on the antitrust violator, while
ignoring the public interest promoted in both trademark and anti-
trust law. A remedy intended to enforce either of these branches
of law that fails to protect the public cannot be upheld on the
ground that it punishes a violator. It has already been discussed
at length that compulsory licensing fails to protect the public
interest in trademarks. What has not been considered, but is no less
apparent, is that the remedy does little to promote the public in-
terest in competition.
A trademark symbolizes goodwill, which in turn is a measure
of promotion and sales. Compulsory licensing strips a term of its
trademark status and consequently undoes the adverse effects of
past promotion and sales to the extent of existing goodwill. Insofar
as monopoly power is a function of goodwill, a restraint on compe-
tition is removed by means of compulsory trademark licensing.
Nevertheless, invalidation of a trademark, while reducing
existing goodwill, does not prevent the adoption and use of a new
trademark by a violator. On the contrary, it hastens such adoption
by leaving a violator without a means to identify its product. A
new trademark, although initially of little value, acquires worth
with the promotion and sale of the product whose source it identi-
fies. A business with great advertising and marketing capacity
quickly acquires goodwill. The business in the best position to
acquire goodwill in a market is the violator of antitrust law, which
by definition possesses far greater sales and promotional capacity
than its competitors. Consequently, any purpose served by invali-
dating an existing trademark to promote antitrust interests is
partially or completely undone by the violator's reacquisition of
a superior market position by entirely lawful means.
Compulsory trademark licensing provides at best only a period
of readjustment during which competitors match their sales and
promotional capacity against the superior capacity of a violator
who must build up goodwill in a new term. The advantage gained
by the competitors is likely to be illusory. In the first place, the
greater the value of a violator's original trademark, the greater
its capacity for developing a new, equally well-known, trademark.
Furthermore, competitors acquire nothing of value with the right
to use a worthless term granted under a compulsory license.
The result brought about by compulsory trademark licensing
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contrasts sharply with the effect of a restriction on advertising or a
divestiture. A restriction on advertising under a trademark reduces
the power of the trademark in the hands of the violator without
invalidating it. Moreover, by not hastening the adoption of a new
trademark by a violator, a restriction on advertising genuinely
improves a competitor's position in relation to the violator, who
cannot effectively reinforce goodwill through advertising. When
a trademark is divested, it is taken intact from a violator and placed
in the hands of a competitor. The remedy cures misuse of a trade-
mark without invalidating it, and gives a competitor a valuable
tool with which to compete in the marketplace-a valid trade-
mark.143
Both divestiture and restrictions on advertising advance both
trademark and antitrust interests, whereas compulsory licensing
injures trademark interests and at best serves antitrust interests
poorly. This result is hardly surprising in light of the wrong sought
to be remedied. For it is the acquisition, through advertising, and
maintenance of excessive goodwill, symbolized by a trademark,
which violates antitrust law; remedies that curb advertising and
effectively reduce goodwill must afford the most satisfactory relief
from both trademark and antitrust perspectives.
CONCLUSION
Compulsory trademark licensing is an inappropriate remedy
for a violation of antitrust law. In practice, it adversely affects
trademark and consumer interests and concurrently fails to pro-
mote antitrust interests. Conceptually, compulsory licensing re-
flects basic misunderstandings concerning the relationship between
antitrust and trademark law as well as an ignorance of and dis-
regard for the interests furthered by trademark law.
Less drastic and entirely appropriate remedies which recog-
nize the rational underpinnings of trademark protection and
respect the balance between the goals of antitrust and trademark
law are readily available. These remedies, including divestiture
and restrictions on advertising, should be adopted in place of
compulsory licensing to correct violations of antitrust law where
trademark misuse has been found to be the cause of such violations.
143. Also, a trademark will not have the same economic power in the hands of the
divested portion of a business that it had in the hands of the business as a whole.
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